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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF ORANGE 
-----------~---------------------------------~-~------------)( 
In the Matter of the Application of 
ROBERTO PASCAL, 
Petitioner, DECISION AND ORDER 
INDEX NO.: 2032/2014 
-against-
NE'W YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
----~--~-----~-----------------------~---------------------)( 
SCIORTINO, J. 
The following papers numbered I to 26 were considered in connection with the application 
by petitioner for an Order and Judgment pursuant to CPLR A1ticlc 78: 
PAPERS 
Petition/Exhibits A-M1 
Answer and Return/Exhibits 1-11 
NUMBERED 
I - 14 
15 - 26 
Petitioner Roberto Pascal (Petitioner) seeks an Order and Judgment pursuant to CPLR Article 
78, for the following relief: (A) release on parole; or, alternatively, (B) a new parole hearing. 
Background and Procedural History 
Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, upon his conviction for 
two murders which took place during grocery store hold-ups in Brooklyn in 1979, when petitioner 
1Note that many of the Exhibits propounded by petitioner have multiple exhibits attached 
to them. 
was 19 years old. In the first incident, which occurred on May 24, 1979, petitioner was convicted 
by a jury as an accomplice acting in concert with co-defendants. In the second incident, on May 30, 
1979, petitioner pied guilty, also as an accomplice acting in concert. Petitioner was also convicted 
of second-degree attempted murder and first degree robbery and pied guilty to separate charges of 
first-degree robbery and other charges. 
Petitioner is a citizen of Panama and is subject to a final Order of Deportation (#A35-l 97-
863) issued by the United States on July 20, 1994. He will be returned to Panama upon his release 
from prison. 
Ile was first eligible for parole in 2004 and has appeared before the Parole Board four times, 
in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, prior to the appearance which is the subject of this Petition. After 
each appearance, parole was denied, and petitioner was ordered held for an additional 24 months. 
On May 22, 2012, petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for a fifth time. P1ior to his 
hearing, on or about May 11, 2012, petitioner was evaluated by the COMP AS Reentry Assessment 
system, receiving a Risk Level 4 rating, the lowest risk rating for re-arrest or absconding. 
(Responding Papers, Exhibit 3) 
At his hearing on May 22, 2012, petitioner was questioned extensively about the 
circumstances of his convictions, including the plea offers made to him and his reasons for having 
become involved in criminal activity. (Responding Papers, Exhibit 4) He was specifically asked 
whether he fired shots or shot anyoac and denied both. He was also asked about his prior criminal 
history, including a drug-related misdemeanor and a car theft. 
Petitioner listed some of his course work and programs which had been completed, including 
network and parenting and healthy marriage classes. He acknowledged receiving one Tier II 
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di°sciplinary ticket, since his last appearance. 
The Board questioned petitioner about the Deportation Order, and he expressed that he 
wished to return to Panama, where he had a cousin and sister. If he_ were not deported, he 
anticipated living with his wife in Brooklyn; if he were deported, he expected that she would come 
to Panama to be with him. He understood that if he were deported, he could not return to the US, 
where his daughter lives. (Exhibit 4 at p. 6) If he were released, petitioner planned to work with 
the Fortune Society, Osbourne Association and Exodus for assistance. (Exhibit 4 at page 7) 
Petitioner acknowledged responsibility and expressed remorse for the crimes he committed. 
(Exhibit 4 at pp. 3, 7) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied parole, and held petitioner for an 
additional 24 months, to May 2014. 2 The Decision stated: 
After a careful review of your record, a personal interview, 
and deliberation, parole is denied. Your institutional 
accomplishments and release plans are noted. Required statutory 
factors have been considered, including your risk to the community, 
rehabilitation efforts and your needs for successful reintegration into 
the community. This panel remains concerned, however, about the 
serious and violent nature of the instant offense, which when 
considered with the required relevant factors, leads to the conclusion 
that ifreleased at this time, there's a reasonable probability that you 
would you [sic] not live and remain at liberty without violating the 
law and your release at this time is incompatible with the welfare and 
safety of the community. 
On May 29, 2012, petitioner filed an administrative notice of appeal and filed his briet: 
perfecting the appeal on May 29, 2012. (Responding Papers, Exhibit 7) The Brief asserted that 
the Parole Board relied on erroneous information and that the two-year hold was excessive, 
2W11ether petitioner has appeared at a subsequent parole hearing, and what disposition 
such hearing may have had is unknown to this Court. 
3 
unnecessary and irrational. The erroneous information including references to the COMP AS 
Assessment, including findings which deemed him to have "notable disciplinary issues;" that he had 
a history of drug and alcohol abuse; and that it was "unsure" whether he had friends and family who 
visited him in prison. (Exhibit 7 at page 4) Petitioner argued that the Board's decision was based 
on now-defunct sentencing guidelines, instead of measuring the likelihood of petitioner's success 
upon release. He further argued that the Parole Board misapprehended his conviction history and 
his current sentences and ignored the Final Deportation Order as well as his rehabilitation. (Exhibit 
7 at pp. 5-6) 
On June 18, 2013, the administrative appeal was denied. (Responding Papers, Exhibit 8) 
Petitioner initially commenced this proceeding in Kings County in June 2013. After an Order to 
Show Cause to change venue, filed by respondent, venue was transferred to Orange County, by Order 
dated February 7, 2014. 
Petition and Answer 
The Petition alleges that the Parole Board's May 22, 2012 decision violates express and 
implied legislative policy. (Petition at 138) Specifically, petitioner asserts that the Board failed to 
comply with the 2011 parole law amendments, requiring the implementation of new written 
procedures for parole release decisions. He reiterates the argument, made in the administrative 
appeal, that the denial of parole was based on the now-defunct sentencing guidelines repealed by the 
1011 amendments. He further argues, for the first time, that the Board's consideration of his 
Youthful Offender adjudications as well as arrests that did not lead to convictions, constituted a 
violation of State Human Rights Law §296( 16) and claimed that these factors also led to negative 
conclusions in the COMPAS evaluation. He asserts that the Board failed to take lhe deportation 
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order into consideration. (Petition at ~45) and that the denial's failure to contain a detailed and non-
conclusory explanation ofits determination violates Executive Law §259-i(2)(a)(I). (Petition at~46) 
Finally, he argues that the denial of his parole was "pre-determined" and an arbitrary, capricious and 
irrational abuse of discretion. (Petition at ,48) 
In its Answer, respondent argues that the Court may not consider issues raised in the Petition 
which were not part of the administrative appeal, specifically, the failure to consider petitioner's 
remorse; the failure to place the Board's deliberations on the record; the consideration of Youthful 
Offender adjudications and arrests not leading to convictions; and the failure to sufficiently consider 
the COMPAS evaluation. (Answer at ~2) However, to the extent that they may be considered, 
respondent asserts that the arguments are without merit. Remorse is not a factor in discretionary 
parole determinations. Nor is there any requirement that internal deliberations appear on the record. 
further, the Board is not only entitled, but mandated, to consider the entirety of an inmate's record, 
including arrests that did not result in prosecution and youthful offender adjudications. Moreover, 
the Board is entitled to place whatever weight it deems appropriate on any factor, including the 
scored COMPAS evaluation. 
With respect to the balance of petitioner's arguments, respondent asserts that the Board is 
entitled to exercise its independent judgment in weighing any statutory factor in making its 
determination. In so doing, the Board may rely on official documents, including the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report, and the inmate is not entitled to collaterally. aftack it. Finally, the Board's 
determination complied with the written procedures requirement of Executive Law §259-c(4). 
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Discussion 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: 
The Court is not empowered to consider any issue not raised on the administrative appeal. 
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that judicial review be limited to 
consideration of only those issues actually raised before the administrative agency which made the 
determination. Roggemann v. Bane, 223 AD2d 854 (3rd Dep't 1996) 
Respondent correctly observes that petitioner's administrative appeal did not include the 
issues of his remorse, or his argument that the Board's deliberations were not on the record. Nor did 
he raise the issues concerning the Board's consideration of his prior, non-prosecuted arrests or his 
Youthfol Offender adjudication. While respondent asserts that petitioner's arguments arc without 
merit regardless of the exhaustion issue, this Court is not required to make such a finding and herein 
dismisses those portions of the petition as beyond the Court's jurisdiction. Matter of Moore v. NYS 
Board of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 (3'd Dep't 1996) 
However, respondent's assertion that petitioner failed to raise COMP AS issue is misplaced. 
Petitioner's Brief on Administrative Appeal does, in fact, address the COMP AS finding that he was 
at low risk of re-arrest, a factor he alleges was ignored by the Parole Board. Consequently, this 
argument may be considered by the Court upon review. 
Standards for Review: 
It has becomcfundamcntal that release on parole is a discretionary frmction of the Parole 
Board. Provided that the detem1ination of the Board follows statutory standards for such decisions, 
it will not be disturbed by a Court, absent a showing that the decision is "irrational bordering on 
impropriety" and, thus, arbitrary and capricious. Matter cifSilmon v. Travis, 95 NY 2d 470 (2000); 
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Matter of King v. NYS Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1st Dep't 1993), a.ff'd, 83 NY 2d 788 (1994); 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 AD3d 10.5 (l sr Dep't 2008) 
Executive Law §259-i( c )(A) provides that discretionary release on parole shall not be granted 
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined, but rather 
after considering ifthere is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. 
Matter ofKing, supra, 190 AD2d at 430 
'TI1e Parole Board is required to consider a number of factors in determining whether an 
inmate should be released. Executive Law §259-i requires the court to consider factors including, 
but not limited to, the institutional record (including program goals and accomplishments, vocational 
education, academic achievements, etc); release plans, including community resources, employment, 
education and training and available support services; any deportation order issued; the seriousness 
of the offense, with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and 
recommendations of the sentencing court, the attorney and the pre-sentence probation report, and the 
prior criminal record. Matter of Malone v. Evans, 83 AD3d 719 (211d Dep't 2011); Siao-Pao v. 
Dennison, supra, Sl AD2d atl06 
The Parole Board's decision need not specifically refer to each and every factor nor must it 
give each factor equal weight. "(fatter of King, supra, 190 AD2d at 431 The weight to~)· accorded 
to each statutory factor lies so·l~ly within the discretion of the Board. Siczo-Pao v. DennJson, supra, 
51 AD3d at 108 However, it is incumbent on the Board to actually consider each applicable 
statutory factor and, "where the record convincingly demonstrates that the board did in fact fail to 
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consider the proper standards, the courts must intervene." Matter of King, supra, 190 AD2d at 431 
Executive Law §259-c[4] requires the Board to incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board and the likelihood of success of 
such persons upon release. Boards must adopt procedures to assist members in determining which 
inmates may be released to parole supervision. Matter ofThwaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34 Misc. 
3d 694 (2011) 
Where the Board's determination includes consideration of all relevant statutory factors, 
including the criminal history, the instant offense, the [lack of] disciplinary infractions since the last 
appearance, program and educational accomplishments and post-release plans, further judicial review 
is precluded. Matter ofBorcsok v. NYS Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 961 (3'd Dep't 2006) 
Conversely, however, when the Board denies parole, it is required to inform the inmate in 
writing of the factors and reasons for the denial, and "[s]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not 
in conclusory terms". Executive Law §259-i[2][a]; Matter of Mitchell v. NYS Division of Parole, 58 
AD3d 742 (2"d Dep't 2009) A detailed written explanation is necessary to enable intelligent 
judicial review of the Board's decision. Matter of West v. NYS Board of Parole, 41 Misc. 3d 
12 l 4(A) (2013) The absence of such a detailed decision inappropriate forecloses the possibility of 
intelligent review. Mayfield v. Evans, 93 A03d 98, 100 (1 51 Dcp't 2010) The decision to deny 
parole cannot be based solely on the nature of the instant offense. Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc. 3-d 
1232(A) (2010), citing Wallman v. Travi.~:,..18 AD 3d 304, 307-08 (1 51 Dep't2005) ' , 
A Parole Board's denial of parole, which focused almost exclusively on the inmate's crim~, 
while failing to take into account and fairly consider any of the other relevant statutory facto rs which 
categorically supported inmate's release, was arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the Board's failure 
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to explain, other than the facts of the crime; why the inmate's release was incompatible with public 
safety and welfare, could not be supported. Matter of Morris v. NYS Dep 't of CorrecNons and 
Community Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226(2013) 
In the instant matter, the Court finds that the Board's decision focused almost exclusively on 
petitioner's crime and his poor criminal record. Although the serious nature of the crime remains 
"acutely relevant" in determining whether petitioner should be released, the Board must still take into 
acc0tmt and fairly consider the other relevant statutory factors. Matter of West. supra, 4 1 Misc. 3d 
at 1214(A) An examination of the transcript reveals that the Board's clear focus was on the subject 
conviction and his prior criminal record. id. 
Such intent is corroborated by the "boilerplate" decision, which. contains the statutory 
language and the "terse, conclusory sentences" that "(y]our institutional accomplishments and release 
plal1S are noted. Required statutory factors have been considered". Id. 
Even more convincingly, in Matter o.fThwaites, supra, the Board's decision stated: 
After a careful review of your r ecord, a personal 
interview, .and deliber ation, par ole is denied. Your institutional 
accomplishments and r elease plans are noted, as is your improved 
disciplinary record. This panel r emains concerned, however, about your 
history of unlawful conduct, the gracity (sic) of your instant offense and the 
disregard displayed for the norms ofour society, wh en consider ed with the 
r equir ed relevan t factors leads to the conclusion that your discretionary 
release is inappropriate at this time and incompatible with the welfar e of 
tbe community and would so deprecate the seriousness of your crime as to 
undermine respect for the law. (Emphasis added) 
Upon review, the Court found that this lan·guage, nearly identical to the finding at bar 
relied almost exclusively on the nature of petitioner's crime. 34 Misc. 3d at 700 While the 
petitioner's accomplishments and release plans were noted, the decision focused on the 
9 
.. 
circumstances of the crime committed more than 25 years earlier. Id. 
Reasoning that employs past-centered rhetoric.and not future-focused risk assessment 
analysis is inconsistent with the rational determination of the inquiry at hand, to wit: whether 
the inmate can live and remain at liberty without violating the law and whether his release was 
incompatible with the welfare of society and did not deprecate the seriousness of his crime so 
as to undermine respect for the law. Id., citing Executive Law §259-i[2][c] 
The Court in Matter of Thwaites found the Board's decision to be arbitrary and 
capricious, irrational and improper based on the Board's failure to articulate any rational, non-
conclusory basis, other than its reliance on the seriousness of the crime, why the Board could 
not believe there was a reasonable probability that the petitioner could live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release was incompatible with the welfare of society and 
did not deprecate the seriousness of his crime so as to undermine respect for the law. Id at 70 l 
Similarly, in Matter of Morris, supru, the Court found that a "passing mention" of 
petitioner's accomplislunents and document submissions, and conclusory statements that 
statutory factors were considered, were "woefully inadequate" to demonstrate that the Board 
weighed or fairly considered the required statutory factors. 40 Misc. 3d at 234; Matter of West, 
supra, I 2 I 4(A) 
In this matter, the Board's decision appears to have accorded no weight and no emphasis 
whatso~ver to any factor apart from the seriousness of petitio.ner's offense. See, Winchell v. 
Evans, supra. 27 Misc. 3d l 232(A} For respondents to have simply restated the usual and 
predictable language contained in so many parole release decisions, with no specificity or other 
explanation to justify parole denial, is unacceptable. Bn1etsch v. NYS Department of 
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Corrections and Community Supervision, 43 Misc. 3d 1223(A) (5/1112014) 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that petitioner has adequately 
established his contention that the Parole Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious, 
irrational and improper. Having so determined, the Court need not reach the other arguments 
asserted by petitioner. 
The May 22, 2012 decision of the Board of Parole is hereby vacated, and to the extent 
not already mooted by any action of a subsequent Board, this matter is remanded to the Board 
of Parole. Within 30 days of the date of the service of a copy of this Order, with notice of entry, 
petitioner shall be entitled to a new parole hearing consistent with this decision and the 
mandates of Executive Law §§259-c and 259-i. The new hearing shall be held before a 
different panel of the Parole Board. 
This decision shall constitute the order of the Court. 
Dated: June 4, 2014 
Goshen, New York 
To: Roberto Pascal, 80-B-1082 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
57 Sanitarium Road 
Otisville, NY I 0963 
Jeane L. Strickland Smith 
~rlvt~ 
HON. SANDRA B. SCIORTINO, J.S.C. 
Office of the New York State Attorney General 
One Civi'~ ·Center Plaza, Suite 401 
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 l 
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